New Report Finds Legalization of Mexican Immigrants Substantially Improves Status of U.S. Economy WASHINGTON (By Daphne Eviatar, Washington Independent) November 5, 2009 ― A new report prepared for the Immigration Policy Center finds undocumented Mexican immigrants who gained legal status in the 1980s via the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) went on to earn substantial gains in their socioeconomic status.
The report
suggests contrary to the idea legalizing
immigrants will increase competition for
scarce jobs in the U.S., legalization of
many of the 11 million or so current
undocumented immigrants would actually
yield economic benefits, not only for
the immigrants but for the U.S. economy
as a whole.
Lessons from the Last Legalization Program
A Note on Definitions
Legalization dramatically reduced poverty rates among IRCA immigrants.
The home ownership rates soared among IRCA immigrants.
Younger IRCA immigrants moved into management occupations.
At a time of high unemployment,
Americans are understandably concerned
about the impact that comprehensive
immigration reform might have on U.S.
workers and the U.S. economy. However,
there is a growing body of evidence that
immigration reform, including a
legalization program for unauthorized
immigrants, would contribute to our
economic recovery. The data analyzed in
this report indicate that unauthorized
immigrants who gained legal status in
the 1980s through the legalization
provisions of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) experienced clear
improvement in their socioeconomic
situation. Between 1990 and 2006, the
educational attainment of IRCA
immigrants increased substantially,
their poverty rates fell dramatically,
and their home ownership rates improved
tremendously. Moreover, their real wages
rose, many of them moved into managerial
positions, and the vast majority did not
depend upon public assistance. In many
respects, IRCA immigrants came to
resemble their native-born counterparts
over time.
It’s important to recognize that factors
other than legalization may contribute
to the improved status of IRCA
immigrants. For example, it’s true that
over time the immigrants simply grew
older and became more experienced as
workers. Yet it is also true that the
benefits of IRCA – such as the ability
to move freely in the labor market, to
take advantage of financial services
such as home or business loans, to
attend a junior college, etc. – are
surely critical factors in the
immigrants’ upward mobility. The socioeconomic gap between IRCA immigrants and native-born Americans narrowed in the years following legalization. While a gap still remains, the data indicate that unauthorized immigrants who have been given the chance to acquire legal status significantly improved their socioeconomic standing relative to the rest of the population. These findings are consistent with other research which has found that legal status allows workers to earn higher wages:
Education IRCA immigrants became better educated:
Legalization dramatically reduced poverty rates among IRCA immigrants:
The poverty rates for IRCA immigrants fell faster than those of natives:
Real wages grew significantly among IRCA immigrants:
Home Ownership The home ownership rates soared among IRCA immigrants:
IRCA immigrants narrowed the home ownership gap with natives:
• In 1990, the rate of home ownership
among IRCA immigrants was dramatically
lower than among natives. By 2006, IRCA
immigrants of all ages had closed the
gap and increased their homeownership
rate compared to natives.
Labor Force Participation
Younger IRCA immigrants saw their
labor-force participation rate rise:
• IRCA immigrants who were 16-24 years
old in 1990 substantially increased
their labor-force participation, from 67
percent in 1990 to 80 percent in 2006.
The oldest immigrants — those age 35-44
years in 1990 — saw their participation
in the labor force fall as they aged
(which is to be expected since some of
these immigrants were 60 years old by
2006).
IRCA immigrants maintained labor-force
participation rates close to those of
natives:
• The youngest IRCA immigrants had
labor-force participation rates that
exceeded those of natives of similar age
in 1990. By 2006, their rate of
labor-force participation was slightly
lower than that of natives, but close
enough that the rate was .98 that of
natives.
Occupation
Younger IRCA immigrants moved into
management occupations:
• The share of younger IRCA immigrants
employed in managerial-level positions
rose substantially, from 9 percent in
1990 to 17 percent in 2006, indicating
that younger workers experienced
significant upward job mobility
following.
The gap between IRCA immigrants and
natives widened in terms of managerial
employment:
• Despite younger IRCA immigrants moving
into managerial-level positions, the
rate at which they moved into those jobs
was less than that for natives — which
means the gap between IRCA immigrants
and natives in managerial-level
positions grew between 1990 and 2006.
Public Assistance
Use of public assistance among IRCA
immigrants remained largely unchanged
overall:
• While unauthorized immigrants have
never been eligible for the major public
benefits programs, legal immigrants’
eligibility for public benefits has
changed significantly since IRCA’s
passage, making direct comparisons
between 1990 and 2006 difficult.6
However, the data show that IRCA
immigrants did not greatly increase
their use of public benefits upon
legalization, even though they became
eligible to receive benefits. Between
1990 and 2006, use of public assistance
declined slightly among IRCA immigrants
who were 25-34 years old in 1990, and
remained roughly the same among those
who were 35 44 years old in 1990.
• The two older groups of IRCA
immigrants became less likely than
natives to receive public assistance
during the 1990-2006 period. For
example, among IRCA immigrants age 25-34
in 1990, the rate of welfare use
declined from .70 of natives’ rate in
1990 to .61 of natives’ rate in 2006
{Figure 14}.
CONCLUSION This report adds weight to the contention that it is time for Congress and the Administration to change our current, ineffective immigration policies and enact comprehensive immigration reform. Moving immigrants into a legal status contributes to the U.S. economy. Providing legal status does not mean that the newly legalized would become dependent on the state for welfare and other public assistance. The data in this report suggest that newly legalized immigrants will become better educated, earn higher wages, heighten consumer participation, and not rush to sign up for the public dole once legalized.
Their wages increased immediately because they were paid better for the skills they already had, and wages increased later as the men freely invested in acquiring new skills after legalization — knowing that it would pay off in increased future earnings. IRCA meant higher wages, improvement of workforce skills, and a level playing field for other workers. Legalization allowed them to seek new and better jobs, training, and education. The newly legalized registered in classes, retrained, and looked for new jobs in unprecedented numbers.
Women who were undocumented before IRCA had been subject to economic exploitation and the fear of deportation. More than two-out-of-five women who applied for legalization under IRCA had started their work lives in the United States as household servants or child-care workers. Although women didn’t gain as much as men from legalization, fewer of them were paid sub-minimum wages once they had legal status. Legalization meant higher wages for these women and a safer environment for the children for whom they cared.
A new legalization program would automatically transform more than one-in-twenty workers into recognized employees openly subject to labor laws. They would earn higher wages, spend more money in the United States, and pay regularly into the Social Security and tax systems.
Today’s undocumented residents are undoubtedly committed workers, too. Roughly 94% of undocumented men and 58% of undocumented women are in the labor force today.6 Since about 5.4% of the labor force in the United States in 2008 consisted of undocumented workers, a new legalization program would automatically transform more than one-in-twenty workers into recognized employees openly subject to labor laws. They would earn higher wages, spend more money in the United States, and pay regularly into the Social Security and tax systems.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan testified in the Senate in 2009 that “there is no doubt that unauthorized — that is, illegal immigration — has made a significant contribution to the growth of our economy.” Going further, he added, “Economists generally view the overall economic benefits of this workforce as significantly outweighing the costs.” But the benefits of undocumented immigration are skewed to those employers who undermine U.S. workers by taking advantage of undocumented workers. The costs are paid by law-abiding employers who are in unfair competition with employers who pay undocumented workers less than other workers, as well as those workers whose wages are suppressed by this practice. The federal government and U.S. taxpayers pay the cost as well. Some employers, who withhold taxes from undocumented workers’ pay but never send this money to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), cheat both the workers and the government.
When we bring undocumented workers out of the shadows, we upend those lopsided benefits and bring them out into the open so that we all share in the economic growth. Fair wages for legalized workers mean fair competition for all U.S. workers. New skills for legalized workers mean a more productive workforce, which improves opportunities for all workers. The right to work means that law-abiding employers can tap into this hard-working immigrant labor force. Non exploitative pay means that U.S. workers compete for jobs on a level playing field. Above-board earnings mean that tax payments are open, too. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), considering the costs and benefits of a 2006 bill that included legalization, estimated $65 billion in new income and payroll tax collections over ten years. The CBO also estimated that there would be higher aggregate wages, more reporting of employment income, and lower income taxes for corporations and business people.
For many years, undocumented migration was circular. Workers from Mexico, for example, came to the United States to work for the agricultural season, returned to Mexico in off-months, and repeated the migration the next year. Undocumented immigrants in the United States were typically lone males whose wives and children remained in the home country. One of the consequences of today’s border enforcement — and the high costs and risks associated with it — has been that migrants remain permanently in the United States, and their families join them here. There are more undocumented women and children, and many more U.S.-born U.S. citizen children with undocumented parents then there ever has been before.
Second, legalization allows undocumented children to become students with a future who can attend college under the same rules as other children. The “DREAM Act” — which would allow undocumented kids who were brought to the United States by their parents to legalize their status and go to college — must be part of comprehensive immigration reform. Third, U.S. born children of undocumented immigrants would not have to fear for their parents’ deportation and then have to choose between family and country.
These children would not have to worry about their parents being deported and would benefit from their parents’ higher earnings.
Legalization, too, provided gains to these community economies. After legalization, successful, newly legalized workers — like Hugo Ortega, who went from busboy to the owner of one of the top restaurants in Houston — added to, complemented, and hired U.S. workers in their communities.
Legalization is good for U.S. workers; raids are not. Raids damage the local economies. A legalization program would have consolidated the economic gains in Postville, not destroyed them. Further, the ripple effects of legalization can help revitalize our nations’ smaller cities and towns during both good and bad economic times. Workers free to report income, buy houses, and participate in local politics will keep our small towns economically and civically vital.
Morristown, New Jersey, a town of less than 19,000 people, recently learned its police force was approved for the 287(g) program, which allows local police to act as immigration officers. Community members including legal residents now fear the police and think the program will hurt the local economy because “immigrants will not want to launch a business in a town where they feel discriminated against.” Community safety will surely be harmed as well. One resident says, “How are we going to have a safe community if people are afraid to call the police?” Big city police have seen the deleterious effects of immigration enforcement and have urged Congress to improve public safety by bringing undocumented immigrants out of the shadows. They know local officers acting as immigration enforcement agents make cooperation with the police dangerous and turn the idea of community policing on its head.
Legalization worked in the past and it will work today. Legalization for otherwise law abiding undocumented immigrants is humane for them and their families, develops a better workforce for U.S. companies, and acts as a workforce development program for young people. Legalization would also create a level playing field and fair competition for U.S. workers, improve the earnings of law-abiding companies, increase the tax revenue of local, state, and federal governments, and free local police to return to crime prevention, crime solving, and building safe communities. There are few federal policies whose beneficial effects would be felt this widely. Our values demand comprehensive immigration reform and our economy is counting on it.
FOCUSING ON THE SOLUTIONS Earned Legalization: Repairing our Broken Immigration System
We can expect every major piece of
comprehensive reform legislation to
tackle the issue of creating a legal
status for the 11- 12 million
undocumented immigrants residing in the
United States. Ultimately, most
politicians and policy makers agree that
practically, the U.S. cannot deport this
population, and some kind of process for
legalizing status is necessary. However,
there remains a temptation to create
high penalties in exchange for a green
card because many politicians want to
ensure that people have paid the price
for coming to the country illegally. An
overly punitive process, however,
ultimately defeats the purpose of a
legalization program because it will
deter people from participating and
potentially drive people further
underground. A successful legalization
program combines measured penalties with
clear and achievable goals that will get
the maximum number of people into the
system, identify the relatively few who
do not belong here based on criminal
activity, and integrate those who can
contribute their talents as quickly as
possible. Legalization, when accompanied by comprehensive immigration reform, is beneficial to the nation.
Taking care to get legalization right
will pay off in a host of ways. If done
correctly, legalization offers the
following benefits:
The following key principles should be
considered when devising a structure: |
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